Rosalind Cazares v. Robert C. Cosby, Annie L. Johnson, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Compnay, Headlands Mortgage Company, Headlands Mortgage Company, Headlands Home Equity Loan Trust, United Security Financial and John Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Rosalind Cazares v. Robert C. Cosby, Annie L.
Johnson, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Compnay,
Headlands Mortgage Company, Headlands
Mortgage Company, Headlands Home Equity
Loan Trust, United Security Financial and John
Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward M. Garrett; James D. Garrett; Garrett & Garrett;Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
J. Bruce Reading; William G. Wilson; Scalley & Reading; Attorneys for Appellees .
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Cazares v. Cosby, No. 20010599.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1894
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROSALIND CAZARES, as Personal 
Representative of THE ESTATE OF 
ROSEMARY COSBY, 
, Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT C. COSBY, ANNIE L. JOHNSON, 
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, HEADLANDS MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, HEADLANDS HOME EQUITY 
LOAN TRUST, UNITED SECURITY 
FINANCIAL and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
HEADLANDS MORTGAGE COMPANY and 
HEADLANDS HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
LINDA WEIR and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No.: 20010599-SC 
Civil No.: 990902004 
Priority No.: 15 
Uj 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, COSBY, JOHNSON AND UNITED 
SECURITY 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge William B. Bohling 
Edward M. Garrett, 1163 
James D. Garret^  6091 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
J. Bruce Reading, 2700 
William G. Wilson, 8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
261 East 300 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, 
Cosby, Johnson & United Security 
DEC 1 9 2001 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
I N THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROSALIND CAZARES, as Personal 
Representative of THE ESTATE OF 
ROSEMARY COSBY, 
Plain tiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT C COSBY, ANNIE L. JOHNSON, 
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, HEADLANDS MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, HEADLANDS HOME EQUITY 
LOAN TRUST, UNITED SECURITY 
FINANCIAL and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
HEADLANDS MORTGAGE COMPANY and 
HEADLANDS HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs/ Appellees, 
vs. 
LINDA WEIR and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No.: 20010599-SC 
Civil No.: 990902004 
Priority No.: 15 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, COSBY, JOHNSON AND UNITED 
SECURITY 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge William B. Bohling 
Edward M. Ganett, 1163 
James D. Garrett, 6091 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
J. Bruce Reading, 2700 
William G. Wilson, 8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
261 East 300 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, 
Cosby, Johnson & United Security 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL 
J. Bruce Reading, #2700 
William G. Wilson, #8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
261 East 300 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, Cosby, Johnson & United Security 
Edward M. Garrett, #1163 
James D. Garrett, #6091 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South, #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
John B.Wilson, #3511 
Laura S. Scott, #6649 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company 
David E. West, #3427 
3440 Decker Lake Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee, Headlands Mortgage Company and Headlands Home 
Equity Loan Trust, and Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellants 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
Robert C. Olsen, #8114 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant/Appellee, Linda Weir and Western Surety Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Jurisdiction 1 
Issues Presented and Standard of Review 1 
Relevant Statutory and Constitutional Provisions 2 
Statement of the Case 3 
Factual Background 3 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 6 
Summary of the Arguments 12 
Argument 14 
The Trial Court's Decision to Hold a Rule 104 Hearing to Determine the 
Admissibility of Appellant's Handwriting Evidence Was Proper under the 
Rules of Evidence 14 
Utah Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 402 Require the Court to Determine 
Preliminary Questions Regarding the Admissibility of the Evidence 
Under Applicable Statutes and Court Rules 15 
In the Alternative, the Court's Exclusion of Plaintiffs Handwriting Evidence 
Could Be Affirmed under Utah R. Evid. 104(b) Because It Was Not 
Relevant In Light of Credible Evidence That Rosemary 
Acknowledged the Deeds 18 
The Trial Court's Exclusion of Handwriting Evidence Properly Fostered Utah's 
Policy of Affording a Strong Presumption of Authenticity to Acknowledged 
Deeds 19 
Because it Has Not Been Repealed, The Acknowledgment Statute's Policy 
Should Be Read Into The Modern Recording Statute 20 
Appellant Has Mischaracterized the Trial Court's Order and the Northcrest 
Case 22 
The Trial Court's Order 23 
The Northcrest Case 24 
The Irregularities in the Notaries' Procedures Were Insufficient to Overcome 
the Credibility of Their Testimony or to Invalidate the Deeds 25 
Because the Trial Judge Disposed of Plaintiff s Case as a Matter of Law, There Was 
No Constitutional Violation below 28 
Because the Court Found that the Evidentiary Hearing Was Dispositive of the 
Entire Case as a Matter of Law, There Was No Violation of the Right 
to Trial By Jury 28 
There Was No Due Process Violation Because the Issues Were Fully Briefed 
By the Parties in Advance of the Evidentiary Hearing 30 
i 
Plaintiff Has Had Her Day in Court, and Thus There Is No Open Courts 
Violation 31 
Because Appellant Has Failed to Marshal All Facts in Support of the Judgment, Her 
Challenge to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Should Not Be Considered 
32 
Even Assuming the Trial Court Erred in Excluding Handwriting Evidence, That 
Error Was Harmless and the Trial Court's Decision Should Be Affirmed . 33 
Conclusion 35 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997) 29 
Berrettv. Denver and Rio Grande Western KK Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992) 34 
Campbell v. Campbell, 146 Wash. 478, 263 P. 957 (Wash. 1928) 35 
Credit Bureau of Preston v. KS. Sleight, 440 P.2d 143 (Idaho 1968) 26 
Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999) 31 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 442 P.2d 468 (Utah 1968) 29 
First Nat'lBank ofPocatello v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 232 P.899 (1925) 26 
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) 1 
Green v. Turner, 4 P.3d 789 (Utah 2000) 1 
Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, (Utah 1949) 34 
Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande Western KK Co., 329 P.2d 407 (Utah 1958) 29 
Handy v. Union Pac. KK Co., 841 P.2d 1210 (Utah Ct. App.1992) 2 
HeberCity Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997) 32 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) 31 
In re Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997 (Utah 1993) 1 
In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) 30 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor <& Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) 
29 
Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454 (Utah 1955 34 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) 2 
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330 (1957) 2, 34 
iii 
Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991) 20 
Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) 31 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) 20 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (1983) 30 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank <& Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 1952) .. 15, 19, 22, 24, 26, 34, 
35 
Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996) 31 
Rowray v. CaperMut. Building <&'Loan Ass'n, 45 P.2d 7 (Wyoming 1935) 18 
Rumsey v. Salt Lake City, 400 P.2d 205 (1965) 29 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991) 33 
Smith v. Smith, 995 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) . . . 28 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App.1994) 2 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 28 
Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 14 P. 338 (Utah Terr. 1887) 20 
United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Or. 1978) 17,18 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1997) 32 
RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 24 13, 28 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(a) 29 
Utah R. Civ. P. 50 29 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 29 
Utah R. Evid. 104 1, 2,12,14-19 
iv 
Utah R. Evid. 402 2,15 
Utah R. Evid. 403 15 
Utah R. Evid. 611 2,17 
Utah R. Evid. 802 15,17 
Utah R. Judic. Admin. 4-501 13, 30 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 etseq 20, 26, 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101 (2001) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4A-4 11, 29, 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 2,11,12,15,16,19, 20, 29, 30, 32 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 26 (1994) 18 
2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973) 20 
McCormick on Evidence § 53, 4th Ed. (West 1992) 18 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7,10, and 11 2, 28, 31 
v 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue # 1: Was it proper for the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to Utah R. 
Evid. 104 to determine the admissibility handwriting evidence, offered by Plaintiff to 
challenge the validity of deeds that Plaintiff claimed were forged? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. "Rule 611 gives a trial court broad 
control over the mode and manner in which testimony is offered. Unless such discretion is 
abused, we will affirm its exercise/' In re Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993). 
Issue # 2: Did the trial court properly hold that the Acknowledgment Statute 
precluded the admission of handwriting evidence, offered by Plaintiff to prove the forgery 
of deeds, after the notaries who acknowledged the deeds gave credible testimony as to their 
authenticity? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Matters of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed for correction of error. Green v. Turner, 4 P.3d 789, 791 (Utah 2000). Whether a 
piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. 
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) 
Issue # 3: Did the trial court properly dismiss Appellant's case, keeping it from a 
jury when it found, as a matter of law, that Appellant had not made out a prima facie case of 
fraud? 
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Standard of Review: Whether a party has established prima facie case is question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1144 
(Utah Ct. App.1994); Handy v. Union Pac. KK Co., 841 P.2d 1210,1215 (Utah Ct. App.1992). 
Issue # 4: Should Appellant be precluded from challenging the trial court's findings 
on account of her failure to marshal all facts in the record that could support the trial court's 
judgment? 
Standard of Review: ffWe uphold a lower court's findings of fact unless the 
evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the finding is 'clearly 
erroneous.' " Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
Issue # 5: Even if the trial court erred in excluding Plaintiffs handwriting evidence, 
can its ruling be affirmed as harmless error? 
Standard of Review: Whether reasonable minds would have arrived at the same 
result, regardless of the error. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330, 333 
(1957). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code, and the Utah 
Rules of Evidence are provided in Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah Const art. I, §§ 7,10, and 11 
Acknowledgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (2000) 
Notaries Public Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 (1998 version and 2001 
Supp.) 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a)-(b), 402, and 611 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees Cosby, Johnson, and United Security find Appellant's Statement of the 
Case inadequate. A detailed summary of the factual background and the course of 
proceedings below is therefore offered for clarification of the nature of the case and its 
disposition. In addition, a chart summarizing the deeds that were challenged by Plaintiff, 
their dates, the grantees, and the persons who notarized them can be found in Addendum B 
to this brief. 
I. Factual Background 
1. On or about February 18,1999, Appellant filed a "Complaint and Demand 
for a Jury Trial" (R. 1-27) in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. (R. 1-
27) 
2. In her Complaint, Appellant Rosalind Cazares ("Cazares") alleged that 
Defendants Robert Cosby and Annie L. Johnson ("Johnson") had participated in the 
forgery of four deeds in order to defraud the estate of Rosemary Cosby ("Rosemary"). (R. 
9-10) 
3. Robert Cosby is the widower of Rosemary, who died on or about January 4, 
1997. (R .a t2 , f4) 
4. The Complaint asks the Court to quiet tide to the various properties, 
described in the deeds, in the name of Cazares as Personal Representative of Rosemary's 
estate. (R. 19-22) 
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5. The Complaint alleges fraud, conversion, and civil conspiracy and asks for 
compensatory and punitive damages against Robert Cosby, Johnson, and United Security 
Financial. (R. 19-22) 
6. The Complaint alleges that Rosemary's signature was forged on the following 
deeds: 
(a) A quit claim deed filed November 7, 1994 in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office, for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's interest in the 
marital residence (3188 Deer Hollow Drive in Sandy, Utah, hereinafter, the "Deer Hollow 
Deed") to Rosemary and Robert Cosby, as tenants in common. (R. 24) 
(b) A quit claim deed filed February 11,1997 in the Salt Lake County-
Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's condominium 
property (Zion Summit Condominium Unit 905 B, hereinafter, the "Zion Condominium 
Deed") to Rosemary and Robert Cosby, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 25) 
(c) A quit claim deed filed March 4, 1997 in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's interest in lot 260 
of the Park Crest Subdivision (hereinafter, the "Park Crest Deed") to Rosemary and Robert 
Cosby, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 26) 
(d) A quit claim deed filed September 29,1998 in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer Rosemary's interest in Lot 49 of 
the Westpointe Subdivision, Plat "B" (the "Westpointe Deed") to Annie L. Johnson. (R. 
27) 
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7. The Deer Hollow Deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary on November 
2,1994, and acknowledged before Linda Weir, an au thored Utah notary, the same day. (R. 
24) 
8. The Zion Condominium deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary and 
acknowledged before Patricia Tunson, an authorized Utah notary, on December 16,1996. 
(R.25) 
9. The Park Crest deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary and acknowledged 
before Linda Weir on December 16,1996. (R. 26) 
10. The Westpointe deed recites that it is signed by Rosemary and acknowledged 
before Linda Weir on March 25,1994. (R. 27) 
11. On November 7,1994, a Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office, recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Deer Hollow Property 
to Defendant United Security Financial in exchange for a $420,000 loan to the Cosbys. (R. 
333-4) 
12. The United Security Financial Deed of Trust recites that it was signed by the 
Cosbys and acknowledged before Tarci D. Carlson, an authorized Utah notary on 
November 2,1994. (R. 334) 
13. On August 23,1995, a second Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office, recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Deer Hollow 
Property to Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, in exchange for a $595,000 loan to the 
Cosbys (the "Chase Manhattan Deed of Trust"). (R- 56-68) 
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14. The Chase Manhattan Deed of Trust recites that it was signed and 
acknowledged before Tarci Eastburn, an authorized Utah notary, on August 18, 1995. (R. 
61) 
15. On or about December 16,1996, a Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Zion 
Condominium Property to United Security Financial in exchange for a loan of $105,000 (the 
"2d U.S.R Deed of Trust"). (R. 340) 
16. The 2d U.S.F. Deed of Trust recites that it was signed and acknowledged 
before Patricia Tunson. (R. 341) 
17. In her Complaint, Cazares claimed that Rosemary's signature was forged on 
all the above-referenced deeds and Deeds of Trust (R. 10-19) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
1. Plaintiff, in her Complaint, claimed that she had retained the services of an 
expert handwriting analyst who had "opined that the purported signatures of Rosemary 
Cosby, appearing on the Deer Hallow [sic], Zion Condominium, Park Crests [sic] and Libby 
Way deeds, are not the actual signatures of Rosemary Cosby." (R. 10) 
2. In a memorandum opposing Defendants' various motions to dismiss the case 
for failure to prosecute, Plaintiff offered, as an exhibit, a letter from George J. 
Throckmorton, dated February 8,1999, offering his opinion that the signatures on the 
deeds in question "appear to be simulated forgeries . . . . " (R. 208-9) 
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3. On April 13, 2001, at a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted permission to J. 
Bruce Reading, counsel for Defendants Cosby, United Security, and Johnson to file a 
Motion in Limine by April 18. (R. 355) 
4. Mr. Reading filed the Motion in Limine to restrict testimony regarding the 
disputed deeds and trust deeds to the notaries who acknowledged them, based upon Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14. (R. 378-9) 
5. Plaintiffs counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the statute was 
inapplicable and appended unauthenticated medical records to his memorandum to prove 
that Rosemary was not in Salt Lake City when the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed was 
acknowledged on August 18, 1995. (R 397-399) 
6. However, the medical records were never authenticated, and the document 
offered to prove that Rosemary was not in Salt Lake City does not indicate where the 
described treatment was administered, or by whom. (R 397) 
7. After opposing and reply memoranda were filed, the trial court entered an 
Order granting the Motion in Limine. (R. 433-4) 
8. By Order, the trial court found that expert testimony regarding the 
handwriting of Rosemary Cosby was inadmissible unless the testimony of the notaries who 
acknowledged the deeds in question was shown not credible by clear and convincing 
evidence. (R. 434) 
9. The trial court gave Plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence that the 
notaries were not credible at a hearing held on May 21, 2001. (R. 434, f 5) 
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10. At the May 21 hearing, Edward M. Garrett, counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
offered into evidence a copy of the Zion Condominium Deed (marked Plaintiffs Exhibit 1), 
and proffered evidence that the notary stamp used by Patricia Tunson on the deed was not 
issued until after the death of the grantor, Rosemary Cosby. (R. 487 pp. 12-13) 
11. During direct examination by counsel for Defendant, Ms. Tunson testified 
that she had called Rosemary Cosby in Florida on December 16, 1996, at which time 
Rosemary had directed Tunson to notarise the Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pp. 5-6) 
12. Ms. Tunson testified that she had known Rosemary Cosby for about thirty 
five years (R. 486, pg. 3), and that she had described the substance of the deed to Rosemary 
before acknowledging it. (R. 486, pg. 6, lines 12-20) 
13. Ms. Tunson testified that although she signed her acknowledgment of the 
Zion Condominium Deed on December 16,1996, she inadvertently failed to affix her seal 
to the deed because she had "set it aside and proceeded to talk to [Rosemary]." (R. 486, pg. 
6, line 24 to pg. 7, line 4) 
14. Ms. Tunson testified that she did not affix her seal until late January 1997, 
after she had received her new commission and new stamp. (R. 486, pg. 7, lines 16-21 and 
Pg- 14) 
15. Ms. Tunson also testified that the December 16, Zion Condominium Deed 
was part of a loan package, and its purpose was to lower the interest rate on the property. 
(R. 486, pg. 16, lines 13-16) 
16. At the May 21 hearing, counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant also offered into 
evidence copies of the Park Crest, Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds (marked 
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Plaintiffs Exhibits 4,5 and 6) all of which bear the notary stamp of Linda Weir. (R. 487 at 
pp. 16-17) 
17. The Park Crest, Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds were offered and 
received into evidence for the purpose of showing that some or all of them were not 
actually notarized by Ms. Weir, even though her stamp had been used. (R. 487, pp. 19, lines 
21-23 and pg. 20, lines 13-23) 
18. On direct examination by counsel for Defendant, Ms. Weir testified that she 
recognized her own signature on the Park Crest, Westpointe and Deer Hollow Deeds. (R. 
486, pg. 19, beginning line 10, through pg. 20, line 8) 
19. When asked why the signatures were different, she testified that "I sign my 
name different ways, depending on how I feel. When Pm rushing, I sign it like Exhibit 5, 
but I do know my signature, and all three of these are my signature." (R. 486, pg. 20, lines 
10-12) 
20. When asked, on cross examination, whether Rosemary Cosby had appeared 
before Ms. Weir on August 16,1996, the date of the Park Crest Deed, Ms. Weir testified 
that "[e]ither she appeared before me or she acknowledged to me that it was her signature." 
(R. 486, pg. 21, lines 12-13) 
21. Counsel for Plaintiff also introduced into evidence a quit claim deed notarized 
by Janet Martin on November 27,1989 (R. 330), (the "Coates and Corum's Deed," marked 
as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7), conveying Rosemary's interest in the described property to the Faith 
Temple Pentecostal Church. (R. 487, pg. 21, line 19, through pg. 22, line 10) 
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22. Although counsel for Plaintiff proffered that he had a witness available to 
testify that Rosemary Cosby was not in Salt Lake City when the Coates and Corum's Deed 
was signed, counsel did not call the witness. (R. 487, pg. 21, line 19, through pg. 22, line 10) 
23. Believing that he had been precluded from introducing not only expert 
testimony calling into question the authenticity of Rosemary's handwriting on the deeds, but 
lay testimony as well, counsel for Plaintiff summari2ed all handwriting evidence by proffer. 
(R. 487, pg. 23, lines 13-16) 
24. In this belief, counsel for Plaintiff was mistaken, as the trial court's Order 
only precluded expert handwriting testimony unless it could be shown that the notaries who 
acknowledged the disputed deeds were not credible. (R. 433-5) 
25. Plaintiffs counsel summamed evidence he claimed he could present at trial as 
follows: 
a. A letter from Fran Fish of the Department of Commerce regarding the 
inability of a notary to obtain a stamp until a commission is issued (for the purpose of 
showing Patricia Tunson did not have the seal used on the Zion Condominium Deed at the 
time the deed was signed.) (R. 487 pg. 24) 
b. A video tape of Defendant Johnson claiming that she is signing the 
signatures of Robert and Rosemary Cosby. (R. 487 pg. 24) (Objection as to relevancy 
sustained. (R. 487 pg. 27)) 
c. A package of Chase Manhattan Trust Deeds and related documents 
reciting execution in Utah in August of 1995 when, according to Plaintiff, Rosemary was 
absent from Utah. (R. 487 pp. 28-29) See also Plaintiffs Response to Motion in Limine, (R. 
10 
394) Trust Deed package not received on grounds that notary nevertheless took attestation 
either in person or over the telephone, as shown by affidavit in the record (R.487 at pg. 30) 
and Affidavit of Tarci Eastburn. (R. 416-417). 
d. Expert handwriting testimony of George Throckmorton to the effect 
that Rosemary Cosby's signatures on the deeds are forged. (R. 487, pg. 32) 
e. Testimony of Plaintiff Cazares and Adrian Jefferson (Rosemary's 
grandson) that Rosemary was not in Utah on the dates that the Zion Condominium (12-16-
96) and Coates and Corum's (11-27-89) Deeds were signed. (R. 487, pg. 33) 
f. Testimony of Plaintiff Cazares and one "Mrs. Morris," allegedly 
familiar with Rosemary's signature, that the signatures on the challenged deeds are not 
Rosemary's signature. (R. 487, pg. 33) 
26. At the conclusion of the May 21, hearing, the trial court ruled that the 
evidence both presented and proffered by Plaintiff did not provide an adequate basis for 
Plaintiff to proceed to trial because the quantum of evidence proffered could not meet the 
clear and convincing standard required to challenge the deeds. (R. 487, pg. 68) 
27. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated June 28, 2001, the trial 
court held that the facts presented at the May 21 hearing did not meet the burden of clear 
and convincing evidence "that any of the notary's public attestation [sic] lack credibility." 
(R. 464, H 3) 
28. The trial court held that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14, and 57-4A-4 
afforded recorded documents a presumption of validity that could not be rebutted by 
Plaintiffs evidence. (R. 464, U 2 and R. 465, f 5) 
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29. The trial Court therefore dismissed Plaintiffs case as no cause of action. (R. 
465) 
SUMMARY O F T H E ARGUMENTS 
1. The May 21, 2001 Utah R. Evid. 104 hearing below was held for the purpose 
of determining whether handwriting recognition evidence was admissible to prove the 
forgery of the deeds challenged by Plaintiff/Appellant Cazares. Under Rule 104(a), the trial 
court has a duty to exclude evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of legal policy. The trial 
court properly excluded Plaintiffs handwriting evidence under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 
11, and 14, which reflect the legislature's intent to give acknowledged documents a 
presumption of validity that cannot be overcome by handwriting evidence alone when a 
notary or other witness is available to testify as to the validity of the document. 
Furthermore, under Utah R. Evid. 104(b), the trial court could have found that the 
handwriting evidence was only conditionally relevant. In other words, such evidence would 
only be relevant if Rosemary Cosby had not instructed the notaries to acknowledge the 
deeds. Because the evidence showed that Rosemary adopted the signatures (whether hers 
or not) by authorizing the acknowledgments, the handwriting evidence was irrelevant to 
prove fraud or conspiracy as alleged in the Complaint. 
2. The trial court properly held that Utah's Acknowledgment Statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (1999), prohibits a challenge to acknowledged deeds by handwriting 
evidence alone. The statute provides that a deed that has been acknowledged and proved by 
subscribing witnesses cannot be challenged based on handwriting evidence unless the 
subscribing witnesses are dead or unavailable. Although the statute dates back to a time 
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when deeds could not be recorded without a "certificate of proof' by subscribing 
witnesses, the policy of the statute is sound and should be relevant today. Because notaries 
are the modern equivalent of subscribing witnesses, their testimony should be primary. 
Only if their testimony can be impeached by cross examination or by extrinsic evidence, 
should handwriting evidence be permitted to challenge the validity of a deed. Without such 
a policy, any interested party could challenge the validity of a deed and take his case to trial 
merely by claiming familiarity with the grantor's signature. Entitling such parties to a jury 
trial on handwriting evidence alone would threaten the integrity of Utah's recording system 
and encourage frivolous lawsuits. 
3. Appellant's constitutional arguments are inadequate under Utah R. App. P. 
24. She has not provided a meaningful analysis of the alleged violations of Utah's due 
process, open courts, or jury trial clauses, and her arguments should therefore not be 
considered. Nevertheless, Appellant arguments fail on the merits. First, there was no 
violation of her right to a jury trial because the case was decided as a matter of law. Second, 
there was no due process violation because motions were submitted according to Utah R. 
Judic. Admin. 4-501, and Plaintiff had adequate notice of all hearings. Finally, the court was 
open to Plaintiff for over two years, during which she failed to find any substantial evidence 
to support her claims. 
4. Appellant has failed to marshal all the evidence in the record which could 
support the trial court's findings of fact, as is required to challenge such findings under Utah 
law. This Court should therefore assume that the record supports the trial court's findings 
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of fact, and review for accuracy the lower court's conclusions of law as applied to those 
facts. 
5. Even if the trial court erred as a matter of law in excluding Appellant's 
handwriting recognition witnesses, such error should not be reversed unless there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different without the error. Here, 
it was plain that even if Appellant had been permitted to put all her evidence before a jury, it 
would not have been sufficient to fulfill the clear and convincing burden necessary to 
challenge the validity of the deeds. 
ARGUMENT 
L The Trial Court's Decision to Hold a Rule 104 Hearing to Determine 
the Admissibility of Appellant's Handwriting Evidence Was Proper 
under the Rules of Evidence, 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding a Rule 104 evidentiary hearing 
to determine the admissibility of testimony by Appellant's expert handwriting witness. 
Appellant correctly observes that the Rule requires the trial court to resolve preliminary 
questions concerning the qualifications of a witness. However, the Rule also requires the 
trial court to determine "[preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of the 
evidence . . . . " Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (2001). 
In this instance, the trial court was not called upon to determine the qualifications of 
the witness, whose credentials were not disputed. Rather, the trial court was called upon to 
determine whether, in light of a legal policy that affords a strong presumption of validity to 
acknowledged deeds, any handwriting evidence was admissible under the facts of the case. 
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See Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952) (holding that 
validity of acknowledged deeds can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence). 
A. Utah Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 402 Require the Court to 
Determine Preliminary Questions Regarding the Admissibility of 
the Evidence Under Applicable Statutes and Court Rules. 
It was proper for the judge to hold a hearing without a jury to determine whether 
Appellant's handwriting evidence was admissible under Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 through 
§ 57-2-17 (2000). Rule 104(a) makes questions of admissibility under the rules of evidence 
the province of the trial judge. Such questions "shall be determined by the court [.]" See 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a). The rule requires a judge to exclude evidence that, although logically 
relevant, is nevertheless prohibited due to policies embodied in evidentiary rules. See, e.g. 
Utah R. Evid. 802 (generally excluding hearsay) and Utah R. Evid. 403 (excluding overly 
prejudicial evidence), for example, are rules that embody such policies. 
In addition, statutory provisions must be considered by a trial court in determining 
the admissibility of evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is 
generally admissible except as provided by statute, constitution, or court rule). While the 
handwriting testimony proffered by Plaintiff below had logical relevance as to the question 
of forgery, the trial judge properly considered that relevance in light of the Acknowledgment 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (2000), which specifically limits the admissibility of 
handwriting evidence whenever a notari2ed deed is challenged. Section 10 of the statute 
provides that proof of the execution of a deed must be, in the first instance, by subscribing 
witnesses. Only in the event that such witnesses are dead or unavailable may evidence of 
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handwriting be introduced. Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 expresses the requirement most 
succinctly: 
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the 
subscribing witness or witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer 
taking the same shall be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses to 
such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had to 
prove the execution thereof. 
At the Rule 104 hearing, the trial judge heard the testimony of the notaries1 who had 
acknowledged four of the five challenged deeds that had been admitted into evidence. 
(Janet Martin, who notari2ed the Coates & Corum's Deed, did not testify at the hearing 
because, according to Defendant's counsel, she was in Indianapolis. See R. 487, pg. 37.) 
Notary Patricia Tunson testified that she had notarized the Zion Condominium Deed 
according to Rosemary Cosby's instructions. See R. 486, pp. 5-6. Linda Weir testified that 
her own signature appeared on the Park Crest, the Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds. 
(R. 486, pp. 19-21) Both notaries testified that Rosemary was either personally present or 
on the telephone with them at the time of the acknowledgments. See R. 486, pp. 5-6 and R. 
at 486, pp. 19-21. In particular, Ms. Tunson, who had a thirty five year friendship with 
Rosemary, testified that the Zion Condominium Deed was granted as part of a loan package 
to reduce the interest rate on the property. See R. 486 at pg. 16. Further, Ms. Tunson 
testified that she had explained the nature of the Zion Condominium Deed to Rosemary 
before acknowledging it. See id. at pp. 5-6. 
[See Point II infra, arguing that notaries are the modern equivalent of "subscribing 
witnesses" under the Acknowledgment Statute. 
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With regard to the notari2ation of the 1989 Coates and Corum's Deed, Plaintiff 
proffered testimony that Rosemary Cosby was living in Indiana at the time of execution (R. 
487, pg. 33) and Defendant proffered testimony that the property was conveyed to the Faith 
Pentecostal Church at that time for tax purposes because the property is the site of the 
church commissary (R. 487, pg. 36). 
The trial judge properly found the testimony of the notaries was credible, and that 
Title 57, Chapter 2 of the Utah Code therefore did not permit rebuttal by handwriting 
evidence. (R. 487, pg. 56) "A determination under 104(a) . . . calls for the exercise of 
judicial fact-finding responsibilities by the trial judge, responsibilities which require him to 
evaluate both credibility and the weight of the evidence." United States v. Enrigbt, 579 F.2d 
980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding trial court's admission of a co-conspirator's statement 
under Fed. R. Evid. 802(d)(2)(E) upon prima facie showing that conspiracy existed was not 
plain error). 
The trial judge's responsibilities under Rule 104(a) are often best carried out in the 
context of a pre-trial hearing where the parties can present their arguments without danger 
of the jury hearing evidence that is later found to be inadmissible. Moreover, Utah R. Evid. 
611 gives trial courts control over the mode and order of judicial proceedings. The trial 
court therefore had absolute discretion to hold a 104(a) hearing to determine the 
admissibility of Plaintiff s handwriting evidence. Its decision to hold the May 21, 2001 
hearing should not be disturbed on appeal. 
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B. In the Alternative, the Court's Exclusion of Plaintiffs 
Handwriting Evidence Could Be Affirmed under Utah R. Evid. 
104(b) Because It Was Not Relevant In Light of Credible 
Evidence That Rosemary Acknowledged the Deeds. 
The trial court's decision to exclude handwriting evidence could also be affirmed 
under Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 104(b), when the relevance 
of evidence depends on the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court may hold a hearing 
and require the proponent to come forward with sufficient evidence for a jury to find that 
the condition exists. See Utah R. Evid. 104(b). If that condition does not exist, the 
proponent's evidence is not relevant and thus not admissible. See United States v. Enright, 
579 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978) (reviewing trial court's evidentiary hearing to determine 
sufficiency of evidence to support preliminary fact that a conspiracy existed, without which 
proponent's evidence in form of hearsay statements would not be relevant); see also 
McCormick on Evidence § 53, 4th Ed. (West 1992) (explaining that the judge may require 
the proponent of the evidence to come forward with sufficient evidence from which the 
jury could find the existence of the preliminary fact upon which the relevance of the 
evidence is conditioned before allowing the admission of evidence supporting that 
preliminary fact). 
In the hearing below, evidence tending to show that the handwriting on the deeds 
was not Rosemary Cosby's was only conditionally relevant. This is because a party may 
adopt a signature written for him by another on a deed by acknowledging the signature. See 
Rowray v. Caper Mut. Building &LoanAss% 45 P.2d 7 (Wyoming 1935) (affirming trial court's 
finding that wife had adopted signature on deed as her own by acknowledging it even 
though husband had signed her name for her); see also 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 26 (1994) 
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.(acknowledgment of deed by grantor will render it a valid conveyance even though another 
has signed the deed for him). 
Thus, the evidence tending to show that the signatures were not in Rosemary's hand 
was only relevant if it could be shown that Rosemary had not acknowledged the signatures. 
In light of the notaries' credible testimony at the Rule 104 hearing to the effect that 
Rosemary had personally instructed them to acknowledge the deeds, Appellant's 
handwriting evidence was not relevant to prove that the deeds were a product of fraud or 
civil conspiracy, as alleged in the Complaint. Because Rosemary either signed the deeds 
herself or adopted the signatures that appeared on them by acknowledgment, the deeds 
were valid regardless of any evidence that tended to prove that the signatures were not in 
her handwriting. The trial court's exclusion of Appellant's expert handwriting evidence 
was therefore proper and should be affirmed. 
II. T H E TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF HANDWRITING EVIDENCE 
PROPERLY FOSTERED UTAH'S POLICY OF AFFORDING A STRONG 
PRESUMPTION OF AUTHENTICITY TO ACKNOWLEDGED D E E D S . 
The trial court properly excluded Appellant's expert handwriting witness in light of 
policies embodied in Utah law. Utah courts have long afforded acknowledged and recorded 
deeds presumptive validity, and have held that this presumption can only be rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank <& Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 
694 (Utah 1952). Utah law further recognizes that evidence of handwriting is merely 
secondary evidence and should not ordinarily be offered when a person who witnessed the 
signing of a deed is available to testify. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 14 (2001) 
(providing that a deed duly acknowledged and proved by subscribing witnesses cannot be 
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challenged based on handwriting evidence unless the subscribing witnesses are dead or 
unavailable). 
A. Because it Has Not Been Repealed. The Acknowledgment 
Statute's Policy Should Be Read Into The Modem Recording 
Statute. 
Utah's Acknowledgment Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 - 17, dates back to a 
time when a deed could not be recorded unless it was both notarized and subscribed to by 
witnesses. See Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 14 P. 338 (Utah Terr. 1887) (holding that a deed must 
be both acknowledged and witnessed or it cannot be admitted into evidence to challenge 
the tide of a stranger to the deed). Today, acknowledgment of the grantor's signature, by 
itself, is sufficient to permit a deed to be recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101 (2001) 
and Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991). 
Because the Acknowledgment statute has not been repealed, the modern Notaries 
Public Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 etseq., must be deemed to incorporate its 
policy. In Murray City v. Hall, the Utah Supreme Court endorsed the following principle of 
statutory construction: 
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that whenever the 
legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes 
relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held that in 
the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the 
new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy 
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be 
construed together. 
663 P.2d 1314,1318 (Utah 1983) (citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
51.02 (4th ed. 1973)). Appellant therefore errs in arguing that the Acknowledgment Statute 
has no applicability merely because there were no subscribing witnesses to the deeds 
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challenged below. This position would render the statute meaningless merely because of its 
antiquity, and abrogate the salutary policy it represents. Although there were apparentiy no 
witnesses to Rosemary's signature apart from the notaries, the policy of the 
Acknowledgment Statute should nevertheless apply. 
While a notary is not required to witness the signing of documents, the notary is the 
closest modern equivalent of a subscribing witness. A notary serves essentially the same 
function, which is to ensure that someone other than the signer can testify from first hand 
knowledge as to the authenticity of a signature. If the notary follows the statutory 
procedures, and there is no reason, extrinsic to the document, to suspect fraud or forgery, a 
deed should be presumptively valid. A challenge by handwriting evidence alone, absent 
other reason for suspicion, would never be sufficient to rebut reliable, primary testimony by 
a notary. Such second-hand evidence should be afforded little or no weight in comparison 
to the notary's testimony. The notary's testimony could take the form of an actual memory 
of the circumstances of acknowledgment or testimony as to the notary's habit of routinely 
following the statutorily required procedures. 
That mere handwriting evidence by itself would carry little weight in comparison to a 
notary's testimony is borne out under the facts and circumstances below. For example, Ms. 
Tunson had had a personal relationship with Rosemary Cosby for thirty five years at the 
time she notarized the Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pg. 3) She understood that 
Rosemary was acknowledging the deed so that she could get a lower interest rate on her 
mortgage. (R. 486, pg. 16) Further, she identified the deed and explained its effect to 
Rosemary before notarizing it. (R. 486, pg. 6) The other deeds were challenged only on the 
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basis of discrepancies in notary Linda Weir's signature and her inability to remember 
whether Rosemary was personally present on any particular occasion when a given deed was 
acknowledged. (R. 486, pp. 21-23) However, Ms. Weir testified that she was familiar with 
her own signature, and that it appeared upon all the deeds challenged by Plaintiff. (R. 486, 
pp. 18-20) She explained that her signature took two forms depending upon the 
circumstances: initials if she was in a hurry and her full name if she was not. (R. 486, pg. 20) 
The Acknowledgment Statute wisely prohibits opening statutorily valid deeds to 
challenge based merely on handwriting evidence when a notary is available to testify from 
personal experience that the signature was duly acknowledged. Without such a policy, any 
interested party (as, for example, and as the present case, the potential heir of a grantor) 
could attempt to challenge the validity of a deed merely by claiming familiarity with the 
grantor's signature and contesting the deed's authenticity solely on that ground. Such a 
party would then be entitied to go to trial based upon an allegation of forgery despite a 
notary's reliable testimony to the contrary that he or she took the grantor's 
acknowledgment. Judicial resources would be wasted, and juries would be unnecessarily 
empaneled, all at significant expense of time, effort, and money at the insistence of anyone 
dissatisfied with his share in a deceased relative's estate. 
B*' Appellant Has Mischaracterized the Trial Court's Order and the 
Northcrest Case, 
Appellant has attempted to persuade the Court on appeal by distorting the facts. 
Neither the trial court's Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine nor the Northcrest case are 
adequately described in Appellant's brief. 
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1. The Trial Court's Order 
Appellant has mischaracterized the trial court's position on the Acknowledgment 
Statute. The trial court did not hold that "a notary stamp is conclusive evidence and the 
only evidence that a Court can entertain on the subject of authenticity." See Appellant's 
Brief at 12. Nor did the trial court state that the Acknowledgment Statute provides that "a 
notary is the only person who can testify concerning the authenticity of a signature." See id. 
Instead, the trial court held that handwriting evidence is only admissible if the challenging 
party can show, "by clear and convincing evidence that the notary public whose testimony is 
to be heard by the Court is not credible." (R. 434, f^ 5) Thus, if fraud or forgery could be 
shown by evidence extrinsic of the deed, handwriting evidence could be admitted. For 
example, if someone could testify that he saw the notary sign an acknowledgment on a deed 
pursuant to instructions by a person other than the grantor, the handwriting evidence would 
be admissible to bolster that testimony. Or perhaps a witness could testify that he had seen 
someone forging the deed and handing it to the notary, who then signed and stamped it. 
Even if a witness could credibly testify that he was privy to a conspiracy to convert the 
property by forgery, the deed could be challenged by handwriting evidence. In such 
circumstances, handwriting evidence could be admitted as secondary evidence to support 
testimony based upon personal knowledge. 
In the trial court below, however, Plaintiff offered no witnesses with personal 
knowledge of any fact, apart from claims of signature recognition, that would provide direct 
evidence of fraud or forgery. At best, Plaintiff proffered testimony by interested parties that 
23 
Rosemary was not in Utah when the Coates and Corum's Deed and the Zion Condominium 
deeds were signed in 1989 and 1996. (R. 487, pg. 33) 
2. The Northcrest Case. 
Appellant contends that Northcrest is dispositive of this case. Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker 
Bank <& Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 1952). However, the Court should consider several 
important distinguishing facts of Northcrest. In Northcrest, the notary executed the 
acknowledgment merely because "she 'thought' it looked like [grantor's] signature." 
Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 694. There was no suggestion that the notary even so much as 
discussed the deed with the grantor at any time. Moreover, in Northcrest, the plaintiff 
conceded that the signature on the deed was not in the handwriting of the purported 
grantor. See id. 
In the case on appeal, Defendants have never conceded that the signatures appearing 
on the deeds in question are not Rosemary's signature. Rosemary discussed the Zion 
Condominium Deed extensively with Patricia Tunson, the notary, before Ms. Tunson 
notarized it. (R. 486, pp. 5-6) Rosemary knew that the purpose of the deed was to lower 
the interest rate on her mortgage (R. 486, pg. 16) and discussed this with Ms. Tunson, 
whom she had known for thirty five years (R. 486, pg. 3). Therefore, Rosemary either 
signed the deed herself or adopted the signature on the deed. 
Further, in Northcrest, there was convincing evidence that the grantor was not 
anywhere near Salt Lake City at the time of the signing of the deed. In the case on appeal, 
only two deeds were so challenged by evidence actually admitted by the trial court (as 
opposed to evidence by proffer). First, Plaintiff offered some unauthenticated medical 
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records in support of her contention that Rosemary was in Florida when the Chase 
Manhattan Deed of Trust was signed (8-18-95). See Exhibits attached to Plaintiffs 
Response to Motion in Limine (R. 397-398). Second, Patricia Tunson admitted, in her 
testimony at the May 21, 2001 hearing, that Rosemary was in Florida at the time of the 
notari2ation of the December 16,1996 Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pg. 5) 
Neither the medical transcripts nor the testimony of Ms. Tunson, however, were 
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of validity afforded to acknowledged deeds. 
The unauthenticated medical records were only relevant to the Chase Manhattan Deed of 
Trust, and were unconvincing due to lack of authentication and the absence of any 
indication in the documents as to where the August 18,1995 medical treatment was 
administered. (R. 397) With regard to Ms. Tunson's testimony, the facts and circumstances 
she related regarding the notaiization of the Zion Condominium Deed tend to give it 
adequate indicia of statutory validity, as will be discussed in part C, infra. 
C. The Irregularities in the Notaries* Procedures Were Insufficient 
to Overcome the Credibility of Their Testimony or to Invalidate 
the Deeds 
Appellant has made much ado over Ms. Eastburn's admission that she sometimes 
took Rosemary's acknowledgments over the telephone, and Ms. Weir's admission that she 
either notarized the August 16,1996 Park Crest Deed over the telephone or in Rosemary's 
presence, but could not remember precisely how she had performed the notari2ation on 
that occasion. However, the fact that a notary has on certain occasions taken 
acknowledgments without requiring the presence of the signer is not direct evidence that the 
notary took the acknowledgments in this manner on the particular occasion in question. See 
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Credit Bureau of Preston v. KS Sleight, 440 P.2d 143, 149 (Idaho 1968) (citing First Nat'lBank of 
Pocatello v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 232 P.899 (1925)). 
In the trial court below, Tarci Eastburn and Linda Weir admitted that they 
sometimes took Rosemary's acknowledgment outside her presence. See Affidavit of Tarci 
Eastburn, (R. 417) (admitting that she sometimes notari2ed Rosemary's documents outside 
her presence, but not recalling the circumstances of the Deer Hollow Trust Deed 
documents); see also Testimony of Linda Weir, (R. 486, pg. 21, lines 12-13) (testifying that 
Rosemary, on all occasions, either appeared before her or otherwise acknowledged her 
signature). However, neither Ms. Eastburn nor Ms. Weir could say that, on any particular 
occasion in question, that they had failed to require Rosemary's presence before notarizing 
the particular deeds or trust deeds challenged by Plaintiff. Without any direct evidence that 
the notaries had failed to require Rosemary's presence on the those particular deeds, their 
testimony was insufficient to impeach the validity of the acknowledgments, which under 
Utah law must be by clear and convincing evidence. Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 694. 
Patricia Tunson did, however, testify that the Deer Hollow Deed was notarized while 
Ms. Tunson spoke to Rosemary over the telephone. (R. 486, pg. 5) This would raise a 
question as to whether the statutory requirement of the signer's "presence" had been 
fulfilled. By statute, a notary must "certify that the signer . . . has admitted, in the notary's 
presence, having signed a document voluntarily for its stated purpose." See Utah Code Ann. 
§46-1-2(1) (1998). 
"Presence" is not defined by the statute. See id. However, Patricia Tunson's 
telephone conversation was an electronic communication that was as reliable as a 
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communication taken in the physical presence of the notary.2 Patricia Tunson had known 
Rosemary Cosby for thirty five years. (R. 486, pg. 3) After explaining the nature of the 
Zion Condominium deed to Rosemary, Rosemary au thored her to notarize i t (R. 486, pg. 
6) The deed was for the purpose of lowering the interest rate on Rosemary's mortgage on 
the Zion Condominium Property. (R. 486, pg. 16) Given that Ms. Tunson had initiated the 
call herself, that she was thoroughly familiar with Rosemary, and that she had discussed 
personal subjects not related to the deeds with Rosemary before acknowledging Rosemary's 
signature, there is no question that Ms. Tunson was, for all practical purposes, in 
Rosemary's "presence." Certainly, Rosemary's physical presence, under these particular 
facts, would have added nothing to Rosemary's acknowledgment that the deed had been 
signed "voluntarily for its stated purpose" as required by the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
46-1-2(1) (1998). In light of these particular circumstances, the Zion Condominium Deed 
should be immune from challenge on appeal. 
2
 It should be of no small interest to the Court that a "presence" by means of 
authorized electronic communication is sufficient under the 1999 amendment to the statute, 
which reads: 
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a 
signer, whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the 
basis of satisfactory evidence, has admitted, and which admission is made 
either in the presence of the notary or by an electronic communication 
that is as reliable as an admission made in the presence of the notary^ 
provided that the electronic communication is authorized by law or rule, 
signing a document voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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HI. BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE DISPOSED OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. T H E R E WAS N O CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
BELOW. . 
Appellant contends that, in the course of the proceedings below, her right to a jury 
trial under Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution was violated, and that she was also 
denied due process and due remedy under Article I, §§ 7 and 11. Appellant's entire 
argument consists of quotes from the Utah Constitution and two short paragraphs that, in 
essence, claim that the trial court erred in dismissing her case for failure to present a prima 
facie case prior to trial. No meaningful legal analysis of how the constitution prohibits such 
a practice has been presented. 
Appellant has inadequately briefed her constitutional arguments. When the overall 
analysis of an issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court, the reviewing court should decline to consider that issue. State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998); Smith v. Smith, 995 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied, 4 
P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). While Appellees believe that Appellant's argument is not in 
compliance with the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) and that her constitutional 
arguments should therefore not be considered, they nevertheless addresses Appellant's 
constitutional issues as follows. 
A. Because the Court Found that the Evidentiary Hearing Was 
Dispositive of the Entire Case as a Matter of Lawy There Was N o 
Violation of the Right to Trial By Jury. 
Appellant complains that she was required to prove a prima facie case to the judge 
before being allowed to take her case to a jury. See Appellant's Brief at pg. 20. The right to 
a jury trial in civil cases is, of course, guaranteed by Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
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See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor <& Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 
(Utah 1981). However, this right is not absolute. Utah courts have long held that when a 
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case before the trial, the case should not be submitted 
to a jury. See Gregory v. Denver <& Rio Grande Western KK Co., 329 P.2d 407, 408 (Utah 1958). 
Moreover, decisions can be taken from the jury by a summary judgment motion under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56 or by a directed verdict under Utah R. Civ. P. 50. 
It is not unconstitutional for a court to exclude a jury from deciding questions of law. 
Such exclusion is the standard practice. SeeAMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
America, 942 P.2d 315, 319-20 (Utah 1997) (holding that application of law to facts should 
be resolved by trial court unless reasonable persons could differ about facts based on the 
evidence). Preferably, disputed issues of law should be recognized and ruled upon before 
trial. See DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 442 P.2d 468 (Utah 1968) (finding that Utah R. 
Civ. P. 16(a) contemplates pre-trial rulings on issues of law); Ramsey v. Salt hake City, 400 
P.2d 205 (1965) (finding that dispositive pretrial order made presentation of issue to jury 
mere surplusage). It is thus axiomatic that there is no perse right to a jury trial when a party 
would lose his case as a matter of law. 
The trial court below held that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10,14, and 57-4A-4 
precluded evidence of handwriting unless the notaries who acknowledged the deeds were 
unavailable or their testimony was not credible. See Order (R 434, % 4). The notaries were 
available, testified at the May 21, 2000 hearing, and their testimony was found to be credible. 
Plaintiffs handwriting evidence was therefore excluded. Once this was decided, Plaintiff 
had no witnesses with convincing evidence to challenge the authenticity of Rosemary's 
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signature on the challenged deeds. The insubstantial quantum of remaining evidence 
favoring Plaintiffs fraud and conspiracy theories did not warrant taking the case to a jury. 
Accordingly, the Court properly dismissed this case sua sponte. 
B. There Was N o Due Process Violation Because the Issues Were 
Fully Briefed By the Parties in Advance of the Evidentiary 
Hearing. 
To satisfy due process, "a hearing 'must be prefaced by timely notice which 
adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet.'" In re 
Worthen, 926 R2d 853 (Utah 1996) (citingNelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1211 (1983) 
(recognizing that ambiguous or misleading notice may constitute a violation of due 
process)). 
Because the issues were fully briefed by the parties in this case before the May 21, 
2001 hearing on Defendant's Motion in Limine below, there is no question that Plaintiff 
was fully aware of the issues to be addressed, and that she had adequate notice. Memoranda 
were submitted in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Defendant filed the motion on or about April 18, 2001, arguing that under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 57-2-10 and 14, no proof of handwriting was admissible to prove that the deeds in this 
case were forged unless the notaries who acknowledged them were unavailable. (R. 381-
384) Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's Motion in Limine on or about May 1, 2001 
(R. 391-399), and a Reply Motion was timely filed in advance of the May 21 hearing (R. 408-
412). After direct and cross examination of notaries Patricia Tunson and Linda Weir, the 
trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case because it found Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14, 
and 57-4A-4 precluded proof of handwriting absent a showing that the notaries were 
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unavailable or that their testimony was not credible. (R. 487, pp. 67-68) Because 
substantially all of Plaintiff s evidence of forgery consisted of handwriting recognition 
evidence by both expert and lay witnesses, it was clear that Plaintiff did not have a case to 
present to a jury, and her case was dismissed. Plaintiff cannot show that she was not 
afforded due process in the proceedings below. 
C. Plaintiff Has Had Her Day in Court, and Thus There Is N o 
Open Courts Violation 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Appellant has failed to specify how this section applies to the case at bar. Utah 
courts have essentially interpreted Art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution to prohibit the 
legislature from enacting statutes that abrogate an existing legal remedy while failing to 
provide an alternative remedy or to eliminate a clear social or economic evil. See Ross v. 
Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). The bulk of Utah case law involving this section has 
considered questions of governmental and tort immunity, statutes of repose, and damage 
caps. See, e.g., Day v. State ex re/. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999) 
(finding section of Governmental Immunity Act violative of Art. I, § 11); Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (finding architects and builders statute of 
repose violative of the provision); Lyon v. burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (finding damage 
caps not violative of the provision). 
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Plaintiff errs if she means to say that the portions of the Acknowledgment Statute 
upon which the trial judge relied were constitutionally defective. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 
and 14 do not abrogate any specific cause of action. These statutory provisions merely limit 
the type of evidence the trial judge may consider when the validity of an acknowledged deed 
is challenged and a subscribing witness is available to testify. 
Moreover, Plaintiff was given access to the trial court. Plaintiff filed the instant 
action on or about February 18,1999. (R. 1-27) After numerous motions and hearings (one 
of which has been memorialized in a sixty-nine page transcript found at R. 487), the trial 
court decided the case as a matter of law after considering the arguments of the parties. 
Plaintiff was therefore given ample opportunity to pursue her claims in the trial court below. 
IV. BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL FACTS IN SUPPORT 
OF T H E JUDGMENT. H E R CHALLENGE TO T H E TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD N O T B E CONSIDERED 
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of 
facts in order to establish that those findings are clearly erroneous. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that, to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against 
the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.' " 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
When a party fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court " 'assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of 
the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.' " Heber City 
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Corp. p. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199 
(Utah 1991)). The legal basis for the trial court's decision has been addressed above and will 
not be revisited here. 
In challenging the acknowledgments of the notaries, Appellant merely recites the 
evidence that weighs in her favor while ignoring testimony that supports them. For 
example, Patricia Tunson explained that she failed to immediately stamp the Zion 
Condominium Deed because she was engaged in a conversation with Rosemary when she 
signed the acknowledgment, and then only some time later did she discover she had failed 
to stamp it. (R. 486, pp. 6-7) Appellant fails to mention this or cite to the record. More 
importandy, Appellant fails to explain how notary Patricia Tunson's procedural errors are 
relevant to the issue of forgery. 
Appellant further fails to direct the Court to where Ms. Weir's testimony can be 
found and offers the bald assertion that discrepancies in her signature go to her credibility. 
She does not explain how this relates to credibility or how it is relevant to whether the deeds 
were forged. Finally, her statement that "there is no evidence . . . that these documents were 
signed by Rosemary Cosby" (see Appellant's Brief at pg. 21) impermissibly shifts the burden 
of proof to Defendants. 
V, E V E N ASSUMING T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D I N EXCLUDING 
HANDWRITING EVIDENCE. T H A T ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND T H E 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD B E AFFIRMED 
The trial court's exclusion of expert and lay testimony of handwriting recognition 
should only be reversed if the exclusion was prejudicial to the substantial rights of a party. 
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Berrettv. Denver andRio Grande Western KK Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992). 
There, the court held: 
[If] the error appears to be of such a nature that it can be said 
with assurance that it was of no material consequence in its 
effect upon the trial because reasonable minds would have 
arrived at the same result, regardless of such error, it would be 
harmless and the granting of a new trial would not be 
warranted. 
Id. (citing Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah 1957)). 
Under the facts of this case, no reasonable jury could have found for Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs theory of the case was predicated upon the allegation that fraud and forgery had 
occurred in connection with the signing of the challenged deeds. However, because the 
deeds were acknowledged, their validity could only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952). 
Clear and convincing evidence has "not only the power to persuade the mind as to the 
probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of 
clinching such truth or correctness." Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah 1955) 
{citing Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204-205 (Utah 1949). Such evidence leaves "no 
serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." Jardine, 279 P.2d at 
457. 
Given the discrepancy between the primary testimony of the notaries, asserting that 
they had acknowledged all the deeds in question pursuant to Rosemary's request, and the 
slender secondary handwriting recognition evidence proffered by Plaintiff, no reasonable 
jury could have concluded that forgery had occurred without "substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion." See id. Further, the fact that the lay witnesses' handwriting 
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recognition testimony would have been by interested parties (the Appellant and Rosemary's 
grandson) would have resolved any doubts concerning the authenticity of the signatures in 
favor of the notaries. (R. 487, pg. 33) Those witnesses were clearly interested in having the 
various properties in question returned to Rosemary's estate so that it could be carved up 
between them by representation. 
Moreover, the expert witness' testimony, even if admitted, would have been mere 
secondary evidence, unlike the testimony of the notaries, who spoke from direct, personal 
knowledge. The expert witness testimony thus would not have been entitled to the same 
weight as the notaries' testimony. c"[T]he testimony of the officer taking the 
acknowledgment would be the most persuasive testimony that could be produced upon the 
fact [of due acknowledgment].'" See Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 695 {citing Campbell v. Campbell, 
146 Wash. 478, 263 P. 957 (Wash. 1928)). 
A directed verdict or a j.n.o.v. would have been foregone conclusions if this case had 
been tried before a jury. Indeed, the empaneling a jury would have been a meaningless 
gesture, and a colossal waste of judicial resources, given the insufficiency of Appellant's 
evidence. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. Utah's Acknowledgment Statute wisely 
prohibits acknowledged deeds from being challenged based upon handwriting evidence 
alone, unless the notary is not available to testify, or the notary's testimony can be 
impeached. Otherwise, any interested person claiming familiarity with a person's signature 
could challenge an acknowledged deed and bring her case to a jury without any further 
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evidence than her self-interested say-so. Such evidence, however, would never be 
substantial enough to fulfill the clear and convincing burden necessary to overcome the 
validity of a deed under Utah law. 
Apart from handwriting recognition evidence, Plaintiff had no substantial evidence 
to support her theories of fraud and civil conspiracy below. Plaintiff had no witnesses who 
could provide any direct evidence of conspiracy or forgery. Defendant, on the other hand, 
had witnesses who could testify from direct, personal knowledge regarding the 
circumstances under which the deeds were acknowledged. Notaries testified at the May 21, 
2000, evidentiary hearing that they had acknowledged all the challenged deeds after 
discussing them with Rosemary Cosby, and had acknowledged the according to her 
instructions. There was no showing that the notaries stood to gain anything from this 
testimony, or that they were untruthful. The trial court's ruling should therefore be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f day of December, 2001. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
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Tab A 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10. 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the 
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no 
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors 
by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. 
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial orunnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
UTAH CODE TITLE 57, CHAPTER 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
§ 57-2-10. Proof of execution-How made 
The proof of the execution of any conveyance whereby real estate is conveyed or 
may be affected shall be: 
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is one; or, 
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, or cannot be had, by evidence of the 
handwriting of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a credible 
witness to each signature. 
§ 57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified 
No proof by a subscribing witness shall be taken unless such witness shall be 
personally known to the officer taking the proof to be the person whose name is subscribed 
to the conveyance as a witness thereto, or shall be proved to be such by the oath or 
affirmation of a credible witness personally known to such officer. 
§ 57-2-12. Certificate of proof by subscribing witness 
No certificate of such proof shall be made unless such subscribing witness shall 
prove that the person whose name is subscribed thereto as a party is the person described 
in, and who executed, the same; that such person executed the conveyance, and that such 
person subscribed his name thereto as a witness thereof at the request of the maker of such 
instrument. 
§ 57-2-13. Form for certificate of proof. 
The certificate of proof shall be substantially in the following form, to wit: 
State of Utah, County of 
On this (month\day\year), before me personally appeared , personally 
known to me (or satisfactorily proved to me by the oath of , a competent and credible 
witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn) to be the same person whose name is 
subscribed to the above instrument as a witness thereto, who, being by me duly sworn, 
deposed and said that he resides in , county of , and state of Utah; that he was 
present and saw , personally known to him to be the signer of the above instrument as 
a party thereto, sign and deliver the same, and heard him acknowledge that he executed the 
same, and that he, the deponent, thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness thereto 
at the request of said . 
§ 57-2-14. Proof of handwriting 
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the subscribing witness or 
witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer taking the same shall be satisfied that all the 
subscribing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had 
to prove the execution thereof. 
§ 57-2-15. Evidence required for certificate of proof 
No certificate of any such proof shall be made unless a competent and credible 
witness shall state on oath or affirmation that he personally knew the person whose name is 
subscribed thereto as a party, well knows his signature, stating his means of knowledge, and 
believes the name of the party subscribed thereto as a party was subscribed by such person; 
nor unless a competent and credible witness shall in like manner state that he personally 
knew the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, well knows his 
signature, stating his means of knowledge, and believes the name subscribed thereto as a 
witness was thereto subscribed by such person. 
§ 57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness 
Upon the application of any grantee in any conveyance required by law to be 
recorded, or of any person claiming under such grantee, verified under the oath of the 
applicant, that any witness to such conveyance residing in the county where such application 
is made refuses to appear and testify touching the execution thereof, and that such 
conveyance cannot be proved without his evidence, any officer au tho red to take the 
acknowledgment or proof of such conveyance may issue a subpoena requiring such witness 
to appear before such officer and testify touching the execution thereof. 
§ 57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed witness—Contempt—Proof aliunde 
Every person who, being served with a subpoena, shall without reasonable cause 
refuse or neglect to appear, or appearing, shall refuse to answer upon oath touching the 
matters aforesaid, shall be liable to the party injured for such damages as may be sustained 
by him on account of such neglect or refusal, and may also be dealt with for contempt as 
provided by law; but no person shall be required to attend who resides out of the county in 
which the proof is to be taken, nor unless his reasonable expenses shall have first been 
tendered to him; provided, that if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the officer so 
authorized to take such acknowledgment that such subscribing witness purposely conceals 
himself, or keeps out of the way, so that he cannot be served with a subpoena or taken on 
attachment after the use of due diligence to that end, or in case of his continued failure or 
refusal to testify for the space of one hour after his appearance shall have been compelled by 
process, then said conveyance or other instrument may be proved and admitted to record in 
the same manner as if such subscribing witness thereto were dead. 
UTAH CODE TITLE 46 (2001). NOTARIZATION AND AUTHENTICATION OF 
DOCUMENTS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES. CHAPTER 1. NOTARIES PUBLIC 
REFORM ACT. 
(1998) 
§ 464-2 Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer, 
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory 
evidence, has admitted, in the notary's presence, having signed a document voluntarily for 
its stated purpose. 
(2001) 
§ 46-1-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer, 
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory 
evidence, has admitted, and which admission is made either in the presence of the notary or 
by an electronic communication that is as reliable as an admission made in the presence of 
the notary, provided that the electronic communication is authorized by law or rule, signing 
a document voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In 
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect 
to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon 
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be 
conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so 
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so 
requests. 
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary 
matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case. 
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce 
before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
RULE 611. MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION 
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation 
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless 
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject 
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The 
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct 
examination. 
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness1 testimony. 
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls 
a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, 
interrogation may be by leading questions. 
TabB 
Summary of the Challenged Deeds and Corresponding Exhibit Numbers for the 
May 21, 2001 Hearing 
Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 
1 
4 
6 
5 
7 
Deed/Type 
Zion Condominium 
Quit Claim 
Park Crest 
Quit Claim 
Deer Hollow 
(Huntsman Plat "A") 
Quit Claim 
Westpointe 
Quit Claim 
Coates & Corum's 
Quit Claim 
Date of 
Signature 
12/16/96 
08/16/96 
11/02/94 
03/25/94 
11/27/89 
Notary 
P. Tunson 
L. Weir 
L. Weir 
L. Weir 
Janet Martin 
Record 
Page 
329 
331 
326 
328 
330 
Grantee(s)/Estate Granted 
Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Joint 
Tenancy with Rights of Survivorship 
Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Joint 
Tenancy with Rights of Survivorship I 
Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Tenants in 
Common 
Annie L. Johnson, Fee Simple 
Faith Temple Pentecostal Church, 
Fee Simple 
Zion Condominium 
Trust Deed 
! Deer Hollow 
Trust Deed (2nd) 
Deer Hollow 
Trust Deed 
12/16/96 
08/18/95 
11/02/94 
P. Tunson 
Tarci Eastburn 
Tarci Carlson 
340 
56 
333-37 
United Security Financial 
(Beneficiary) 
Chase Manhattan (Beneficiary) 
United Security Financial 
(Beneficiary) I 
